Oversight Committee Releases Proposed Abramoff Report
Read extensive background on the Abramoff investigation >>
Excerpts from the Executive Summary:
The Committee's investigation was hindered in several ways that limit the scope of the Committee's conclusions. First, six individuals, including three former White House officials, whom the Committee sought to depose or interview refused in whole or in part to answer the Committee's questions on Fifth Amendment grounds. Second, the Committee did not take the depositions of several relevant lobbyists identified in the 2006 Committee staff report, including Mr. Abramoff himself, because the Department of Justice expressed concern that congressional depositions could undermine ongoing investigations. Third, the Justice Department asked to withhold documents from the Committee out of a similar concern. Fourth, several of the individuals deposed or interviewed by the Committee asserted that they were unable to recall the specifics of some of the matters under investigation, which occurred four to seven years ago.It is possible the investigation was also made more difficult by the fact that some White House officials may have used e-mail accounts maintained by the Republican National Committee to discuss Abramoff matters among themselves. The RNC informed the Committee that it has retained few or no e-mails for these officials for the relevant time period.
Despite these limitations, the documents and testimony obtained by the Committee confirm that Mr. Abramoff and his associates had contacts with White House officials and influenced some Administration decisions.
Mr. Abramoff's Influence Inside the White House. The documents show that Mr. Abramoff and his associates influenced some White House actions. In one instance, the Abramoff team persuaded White House officials to intervene to remove from office a State Department official, Alan Stayman, who had advocated reforms in the Northern Mariana Islands that Mr. Abramoff opposed. In one exchange, Mr. Schlapp e-mailed Monica Kladakis, the deputy associate director of presidential personnel, to ask "how do we fix this?" Ms. Kladakis responded: "I think we can do something about it, but I'm trying to figure out what is the best way to go about it. I don't want a firing scandal on our hands." Both Karl Rove, the President's top political advisor, and Stephen Hadley, the deputy National Security Advisor, were informed of Mr. Abramoff's opposition to Mr. Stayman.
Following the release of the Committee's September 2006 staff report, White House officials said the White House would take a "good hard look" and conduct a "thorough review" of the contacts that Mr. Abramoff had with White House officials. The Committee asked several former White House officials interviewed or deposed by the Committee whether the White House contacted them to inquire about their contacts with Mr. Abramoff. None of the White House officials who spoke with the Committee had any recollection of White House officials asking them about their contacts with Mr. Abramoff or his associates.
Excerpts from the Findings:
The testimony and documents obtained by the Committee following the September 2006 Committee staff report confirm that Mr. Abramoff had access to the White House. Further, the record before the Committee contradicts White House claims that with respect to his White House contacts, Mr. Abramoff got "nothing out of it." Not only did Mr. Abramoff achieve some positive results from his White House lobbying, but White House officials sought out the views of Mr. Abramoff and his colleagues on matters of official business.
Jack Abramoff Influenced Some White House ActionsSenior White House officials held Mr. Abramoff and others on his team in high regard. In a deposition, Matt Schlapp, Director of the White House Office of Political Affairs (OPA) from 2003 to 2005, testified that he considered Mr. Abramoff to be a "point of information," based on "his knowledge and his experience and his judgment on issues surrounding politics and policy and how the town works." With respect to Tony Rudy, Mr. Schlapp said, "He is somebody I had great professional trust in, whose opinion I respected." Similarly, Ken Mehlman, Director of OPA from 2001 to 2003, stated, "Mr. Rudy is someone I knew, and believed to be a person that was honest and supportive of the President."
Consistent with these statements, records obtained by the Committee show that communications from Mr. Abramoff and his associates carried weight with White House officials. In some instances, White House officials took action that advanced Mr. Abramoff's lobbying goals. Other times, White House officials reached out to Mr. Abramoff and his team to seek their views on policy matters. And the documents contain examples in which White House officials gave consideration to Mr. Abramoff's communications in policy deliberations even though they ultimately did not take the action requested by Mr. Abramoff.
1. White House Officials Intervened in a State Department Decision Regarding Extending the Employment of State Department Official Allen Stayma
One action that White House officials took at the request of Mr. Abramoff was to intervene to force the removal of a State Department official, Alan Stayman. In a previous position at the Office of Insular Affairs in the Department of the Interior, Mr. Stayman had advocated positions opposed by the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, then a client of Mr. Abramoff. Mr. Stayman was appointed to his position at the Department of State during the Clinton Administration.
The Greenberg Traurig documents described in the September 2006 staff report indicated that the Abramoff team lobbied the White House for the removal of Allen Stayman from his position at the State Department despite the fact that Mr. Stayman's superiors at the State Department had approved the extension of his employment in June 2001. Documents provided to the Committee by the White House and State Department, as well as testimony from White House officials, corroborate the Greenberg Traurig evidence that the White House was involved in the Stayman matter, as well as the account the Committee received from Mr. Stayman. In a recent Committee deposition, Monica Kladakis, then-Deputy Associate Director in the White House Office of Presidential Personnel (OPP), confirmed that OPP became involved in Mr. Stayman's removal after White House officials were contacted by Mr. Abramoff's team. In a July 2001 e-mail produced by the White House, Stuart Holiday, then-Associate Director of OPP, summarized the Stayman matter as follows: "We pulled the plug on him."
The September 2006 Committee report described Mr. Stayman's employment history as follows:
Stayman was an official in the Department of the Interior's Office of Insular Affairs during the 1990s who advocated labor reforms for the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands that Abramoff opposed on behalf of his client, which was the Commonwealth. Beginning in 1999, Stayman served in the State Department as chief negotiator for the compacts of free association then under negotiation regarding the Marshall Islands and the Federated States of Micronesia. Stayman was serving in a position ... in which government officials are hired for renewable one-year terms to focus on a particular task. Stayman submitted the required paperwork for a third term in early 2001 with the support of his superiors at the State Department. According to Stayman, the compact negotiations for which he had been hired were expected to be completed within the next two years...Stayman says that in May or June 2001, sometime after he had filed his paperwork to extend his tenure, his superior at the Department of State, who was among those who had approved Stayman's application for an extension, informed Stayman that politics had been brought into the decision, which Stayman took to mean White House involvement, and as a result Stayman's appointment would not be renewed. He said that the State Department then negotiated a transition period of four months to enable him to train a replacement.
Greenberg Traurig documents indicated that White House officials intervened in the decision about Mr. Stayman's tenure at the State Department after being contacted by the Abramoff team, and that Mr. Stayman was removed from his position. These documents included a January 29, 2001, report by Tony Rudy to his colleague that Ken Mehlman said he would get Mr. Stayman "fired."
The new documents obtained by the Committee provide additional detail as to what transpired regarding Mr. Stayman's employment at the State Department. According to State Department documents, in 2001 Mr. Stayman's superiors at the State Department supported extending his employment there well into 2003. In the spring of 2001, the Bureau of East Asia and Pacific Affairs created a new position for Mr. Stayman. According to a May 1, 2001, memo by James Kelly, whom President George W. Bush had appointed Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of East Asia and Pacific Affairs, the Bureau terminated the "special negotiator" position and "classified a successor position of 'Director,' Office of Compact Negotiations." In this memo, Ambassador Kelly also nominated Mr. Stayman to serve in this "Director" position, noting:
The Special Negotiator appointment was held by Mr. Allen Stayman. He is now in the midst of negotiations. Four formal sessions have been held and further sessions are scheduled for May and July. Given the state of negotiations, and Mr. Stayman's experience as the point person for the Bureau, we nominate him for appointment as Director to serve until at least November 4, 2003 (see resume attached).Consistent with Ambassador Kelly's memo, a Request for Personnel Action filed with an effective date of June 30, 2001, provided for a change in Mr. Stayman's title from "Special Negotiator" to "Office Director." This document states this action was approved by the Executive Resources Board on June 26, 2001, and by the Office of Personnel Management on June 29, 2001.
The White House documents show that Mr. Abramoff, Mr. Rudy, and Kevin Ring pressed the Stayman case with White House officials. At the White House, Matt Schlapp, Monica Kladakis, and Susan Ralston had the most frequent communications on this issue. However, the White House discussion of Mr. Stayman's position ultimately involved Karl Rove and even reached top National Security Council staff. And in the internal White House communications about Mr. Stayman's case, White House officials repeatedly noted they would be giving status reports to Abramoff lobbyists.
On May 9, 2001, Monica Kladakis, Deputy Associate Director in the White House Office of Presidential Personnel, e-mailed Tony Rudy and said: "By the way, I have not forgotten about your concern about Alan Stayman -- we just have had to work on filling our top positions before focusing on the possibly problematic people." Mr. Rudy responded, "More evidence of your greatness! Thanks." On June 11, 2001, Mr. Rudy followed up with Ms. Kladakis, asking if there was "any news" on Mr. Stayman, and three days later e-mailed her to provide a resume of a suggested replacement for Mr. Stayman. On the same day, Ms. Kladakis thanked him for the resume and responded, "We're still checking this out."
On June 18, 2001, Mr. Rudy e-mailed Matt Schlapp about the Stayman appointment, reminding Mr. Schlapp that they had spoken about the issue "a few months ago," and asking "Is there anyway [sic] you can weigh in with presidential personnel?" The same day, Mr. Schlapp forwarded Mr. Rudy's e-mail to Monica Kladakis, asking "how do we fix this?" Ms. Kladakis replied that she was seeking information from Doug Fehrer at the Office of Personnel Management regarding whether Stayman was a career or political appointee, and said, "I think we can do something about it, but I'm trying to figure out what is the best way to go about it. I don't want a firing scandal on our hands." Mr. Schlapp responded, "Let me know if I need to call Kay James or Doug." Ms. Kladakis followed up with Mr. Schlapp the same day, reporting, "I just got off the phone with Doug -- he's got a couple of things to look into for me but it looks good."
On June 20, 2001, Ms. Kladakis again e-mailed Mr. Schlapp, telling him, "Good news -- State is going to inform Al Stayman that his term is not going to be extended, so as of June 30 he will be gone. I will let Tony Rudy know." Mr. Schlapp responded, "Will you let Tony know for me as well? He has talked to me about it a few times."
Around the same time that Mr. Rudy was reaching out to Mr. Schlapp and Ms. Kladakis, Mr. Abramoff also made the case for White House intervention to Ms. Ralston. The White House documents contained a version of the June 25, 2001, e-mail exchange between Mr. Abramoff and Ms. Ralston that was also in the Greenberg production. In this e-mail, Mr. Abramoff expressed concern about Mr. Stayman staying at the State Department, and provided background to Ms. Ralston on Mr. Stayman that he asked her to pass to Karl Rove. The White House documents reveal that Ms. Ralston then forwarded Mr. Abramoff's e-mail to Matt Schlapp, asking "Do you know anything about this?," and Mr. Schlapp replied, "yes, we are all over it. This is a problem."
The White House documents additionally show that on June 26, 2001, Mr. Abramoff sent Ms. Ralston information on a proposed replacement for Mr. Stayman. Ms. Ralston forwarded this e-mail to Mr. Schlapp, noting "Here's who Jack recommends for Stayman's spot at State." Mr. Schlapp the same day forwarded Mr. Abramoff's information to Ms. Kladakis, asking, "what about his guy?" Ms. Kladakis responded that Ambassador Kelly had interviewed him and had concerns.
According to the White House documents, on June 27, 2001, Kevin Ring sent Ms. Ralston a Washington Times column that expressed concern about the potential extension of Mr. Stayman's employment at the State Department. Ms. Ralston forwarded this e-mail to Mr. Schlapp, noting "more bad news on Stayman," and he forwarded this e-mail in turn to Ms. Kladakis. In response, Ms. Kladakis explained that the termination of Mr. Stayman's tenure involved a four-month transition period: "Stayman was approved for a 4-month extension -- our Assistant Secretary did not want a vacancy (negotiations next week) and concerned that 3 months would not be enough since State takes 90 days on average for clearance. I've passed this on to Tony Rudy."
On June 29, 2001, Ms. Ralston told Ms. Kladakis that a member of Congress was concerned that Mr. Stayman was not leaving until after the four-month transition period. Ms. Kladakis responded by reiterating to Ms. Ralston the information she had provided to Mr. Schlapp regarding the Assistant Secretary's concerns about needing Mr. Stayman during the negotiations coming up the next week and ensuring sufficient time to process the clearance of his replacement. Ms. Ralston in turn forwarded this explanation to Karl Rove on June 29, asking if she could talk with him about the matter and referencing the memo Mr. Abramoff provided.
On July 2, 2001, Ms. Ralston e-mailed Mr. Abramoff's memo on Allen Stayman to National Security Council staff director Stephen Hadley, copying two other individuals with National Security Council e-mail addresses, noting "Karl asked me to pass this email on to you." She explained that Mr. Stayman had been provided a four-month stay at State before he was to leave, and that a member of Congress was upset, and asked what Mr. Hadley could do to help. The documents do not reflect that Mr. Hadley took any action or responded to this e-mail. On July 5, 2001, Mr. Rove e-mailed Mr. Schlapp to ask the status of the Stayman matter.
In his deposition with the Committee, Mr. Schlapp asserted that he remembered "vaguely working on a case that involved" Mr. Stayman, but that he did not know whether he followed up on Tony Rudy's June 18, 2001, e-mail request for assistance in the Stayman matter, and he did not recall talking with anyone in the Office of Presidential Personnel or anywhere else in the White House about this issue.
Similarly, Mr. Mehlman stated that he had a very "murky recollection" of the Stayman matter, a "general recollection of yeah, there was some guy they didn't like, but I don't remember a lot of the specifics." Ms. Ralston would not address any subject concerning communications with the Abramoff team.
In her Committee deposition, Ms. Kladakis said she believed Mr. Rudy was the person who "first brought the situation [with Mr. Stayman] to my attention," and she did not dispute that OPP intervened in the decision regarding Mr. Stayman's employment at the State Department. More specifically, Ms. Kladakis said she recalled talking with Ambassador Kelly about Mr. Stayman, and that the Ambassador was "very upset at the idea of us having Stayman leave, because there would be -- it takes a while to find a replacement and clear them through, and he was -- very strongly did not want us to ask him to leave after his term ended."
Ms. Kladakis said it was "not common" for the Office of Presidential Personnel to stop an agency personnel action from going forward where an agency official was recommending a personnel action and the Office of Personnel Management had signed off on such action. She further testified that "very rarely" did the White House "either force someone on an assistant secretary or veto someone that the assistant secretary wanted," and that involvement by lobbyists in OPP conversations about hiring and firing individuals was not common.
Ms. Kladakis stated in her deposition that the White House in the Stayman matter was "caught between our assistant secretary and congressional Republicans," as there were Republican members of Congress who opposed the extension of Mr. Stayman's tenure at the State Department. The documents the White House produced to the Committee show no evidence of congressional contacts with the White House on the Stayman matter until over a week after Ms. Kladakis's June 20, 2001, report to Mr. Schlapp that the decision had been made to remove Mr. Stayman from State Department. The White House documents show that while some congressional Republicans opposed Mr. Stayman, other congressional Republicans supported Mr. Stayman.
Ms. Kladakis also stated that the Bush Administration allowed a number of deputy-level Clinton Administration appointees to stay on "in order to have some continuity and to not completely destabilize the agency," but that "ultimately we planned to replace all of them with Bush appointees." In his deposition, Mr. Schlapp agreed that there was not a high volume of Clinton appointees who transitioned into the Bush Administration.
2. The White House Communicated with the Abramoff Team in Considering Candidates for Political Positions in the Administration
One of the main Administration offices of interest to the Abramoff team was the Office of Insular Affairs (OIA) at the Department of the Interior, which handles issues relating to Pacific Island territories where Mr. Abramoff had clients. The Greenberg Traurig documents showed and the White House documents corroborate that the Abramoff team succeeded in obtaining information from White House officials regarding the status of the nomination process for OIA posts. In addition, the White House records and testimony of White House officials show that top White House aides solicited and considered the views of Mr. Abramoff and his associates in deliberations over OIA appointments.
One example of the Abramoff team's access to the White House regarding the nomination process is a February 20, 2001, e-mail from Susan Ralston to Matt Schlapp to let him know that Jack Abramoff had called Karl Rove a few days earlier to discuss appointments at OIA. According to this e-mail, Mr. Abramoff had heard that Esther Kia'aina was going to be considered for a position and "wanted to let Karl know that he didn't think this was a good idea." Ms. Ralston continued, "Karl asked that you return his call." Ms. Kia'aina was not appointed to a position at OIA.
On some occasions, White House officials initiated contact with Mr. Abramoff and his associates to solicit recommendations on nominations for Administration posts. For example, Mr. Schlapp faxed Mr. Abramoff information he had received from the Office of Presidential Personnel regarding a candidate for an OIA position. Mr. Schlapp testified that he did not recall the specific fax, but that he did "remember interacting with [Mr. Abramoff] on these candidates." He also said did not recall sending resumes to any other lobbyists.
In another example, a January 28, 2002, e-mail provided to the Committee by the White House, Mr. Schlapp asked a White House staffer, Doug Hoelscher, Political Coordinator in the Office of Political Affairs, to send Tony Rudy the resume of Jeff Crane, a candidate for a position at OIA. He explained to Ms. Ralston the same day, "KR wants me to push Jeff Crane who used to work for Chairman Young. I told Tony to check the guy out." Mr. Abramoff did not support Mr. Crane and Mr. Crane did not receive the appointment.
On a number of occasions, White House officials used information Mr. Abramoff provided in policy deliberations. For example, in September 2002, when Matt Schlapp, then-Deputy White House Political Director, asked Ms. Ralston if Karl Rove wanted "Fred Radewagon to get strong consideration" for appointment to the position of Director of OIA. Ms. Ralston replied 45 minutes later with the note, "Definitely not Radewagon. Here's the intel I got on him." The rest of her e-mail quotes directly, without attribution, from an e-mail Jack Abramoff had sent her the previous month. In this e-mail, Ms. Ralston passed on information from Mr. Abramoff to support her assertion that Mr. Rove would not support Mr. Radewagon. Mr. Radewagon did not get the appointment.
Another example concerns Mr. Abramoff's efforts to secure an appointment for Mark Zachares as Director of OIA. E-mails provided to the Committee by the White House suggest that Mr. Rove's office advocated Mr. Abramoff's position as Mr. Zachares's application moved forward. In an e-mail to Mr. Schlapp on August 6, 2001, Ms. Ralston noted, "Jack Abramoff wants to make sure someone interviews Mark Zachares who is their top priority." Mr. Schlapp responded: "he will get interviewed." Mr. Schlapp then forwarded this e-mail exchange to Julie Lapeyre in the Office of Presidential Personnel with the following note: "I told Susan all our folks would be interviewed." On November 9, 2001, internal White House e-mails indicate that, "Mark Zachares had been a push for us for a while per Karl and Susan," and that "Karl and Susan have shown much interest in Zachares." Mr. Zachares was not ultimately appointed to this position.
3. Mr. Abramoff Influenced Decisions about Presidential Political Endorsements
Mr. Abramoff and his team also succeeded in persuading the White House to refrain from issuing a presidential endorsement of Juan Babauta, the Republican gubernatorial candidate in the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI) in 2001, who was running against a third party candidate favored by Mr. Abramoff. According to the Greenberg Traurig documents, on October 26, 2001, Mr. Abramoff sent a memo to Mr. Mehlman arguing against an endorsement, spoke with Mr. Mehlman over the phone about this issue in the same time frame, and received an e-mail from Susan Ralston on October 31, 2001, stating: "You win :). KR said no endorsement."
The White House documents not only corroborate the Greenberg Traurig documents on this matter, but they indicate the White House took the position advanced by Mr. Abramoff despite the fact that Republican National Committee staff urged a Babauta endorsement by the President. The White House documents also provide additional information about how the White House handled contacts from Mr. Abramoff's team on this issue.
According to the White House documents, on October 17, 2001, Mr. Rudy e-mailed Mr. Schlapp and Mr. Mehlman to request the "huge favor" that the White House refrain from endorsing Mr. Babauta, and, in a follow-up e-mail provided Mr. Schlapp with background on Mr. Babauta. Mr. Mehlman forwarded the Rudy request to Leonard Rodriguez, who worked under Mr. Mehlman in the Office of Political Affairs, instructing, "Please advise on whether to do this or not, reaching out to the relevant people at the RNC." Mr. Schlapp forwarded the background from Mr. Rudy to Mr. Rodriguez. Mr. Rodriguez then followed up with the RNC, was told that the RNC's Western Regional Political Director "strongly recommends that Mr. Babauta receive an endorsement from President Bush," and forwarded this information to Mr. Mehlman and Mr. Schlapp.
There is no public record of any presidential endorsement of Juan Babauta in the 2001 CNMI gubernatorial race. Mr. Mehlman was not aware of any other instance where the President refrained from endorsing the Republican gubernatorial candidate.
When questioned about this matter by the Committee, White House officials asserted they had difficulty remembering what happened with this Abramoff request. Mr. Mehlman testified he did not know why the President didn't issue an endorsement in the CNMI gubernatorial election. He further stated, "I remember getting data and feedback" on the issue, but regarding conversations with Mr. Abramoff he said, "I don't remember if I talked to him or Leonard did." Matt Schlapp testified that he did not have any specific recollection of discussions among White House officials regarding whether the President would endorse Mr. Babauta.
According to Greenberg Traurig documents, Mr. Abramoff also asked Mr. Mehlman for a presidential endorsement of candidates running for office in Guam in 2002. Within two weeks of this request, Mr. Abramoff received a quote from President Bush on the candidates via Mr. Rodriguez. In an interview with Committee staff, Mr. Mehlman did not dispute that the request occurred. When asked whether he instructed Mr. Rodriguez to provide the endorsement quote to Mr. Abramoff, he testified: "I don't remember asking him, but I am assuming that I did."