"(Wish We Had Some!)"

On Thursday we noted a new report from the Pentagon's Inspector General which "found that a program to deliver special armored vehicles to protect military personnel in Iraq from roadside bombs has been marred by delays and questionable contracting practices that may have endangered troops." Rep. Louise Slaughter (NY-28), who requested the report, issued a release summarizing it:

Each manufacturer fell far behind delivery schedules, while Armored Holdings also produced inadequate and faulty equipment. Furthermore, the sole-source contracts were assigned even though senior military officials objected at the time to the process being used, advocating instead for competitive bidding.

Armored Holdings announced today "the receipt of a new prime contract award by the U.S. Navy for $518.5 million to provide Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles."

More disturbingly, USA Today publishes an extensive investigation into the delays in production of this vital vehicle on its front page today. Some of the most alarming findings:

Pentagon balked at pleas from officers in field for safer vehicles

Peter Eisler, Blake Morrison and Tom Vanden Brook, USA Today - July 16, 2007

Pfc. Aaron Kincaid, 25, had been joking with buddies just before their Humvee rolled over the bomb. His wife, Rachel, later learned that the blast blew Kincaid, a father of two from outside Atlanta, through the Humvee's metal roof.

Army investigators who reviewed the Sept. 23 attack near Riyadh, Iraq, wrote in their report that only providence could have saved Kincaid from dying that day: "There was no way short of not going on that route at that time (that) this tragedy could have been diverted."

A USA TODAY investigation of the Pentagon's efforts to protect troops in Iraq suggests otherwise.

Years before the war began, Pentagon officials knew of the effectiveness of another type of vehicle that better shielded troops from bombs like those that have killed Kincaid and 1,500 other soldiers and Marines. But military officials repeatedly balked at appeals -- from commanders on the battlefield and from the Pentagon's own staff -- to provide the lifesaving Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicle, or MRAP, for patrols and combat missions, USA TODAY found.

In a letter to Defense Secretary Robert Gates late last month, two U.S. senators said the delays cost the lives of an estimated "621 to 742 Americans" who would have survived explosions had they been in MRAPs rather than Humvees.

The letter, from Sens. Joseph Biden, D-Del., and Kit Bond, R-Mo., assumed the initial calls for MRAPs came in February 2005, when Marines in Iraq asked the Pentagon for almost 1,200 of the vehicles. USA TODAY found that the first appeals for the MRAP came much earlier.

The article specifies that requests were made "As early as December 2003," and that the technology has existed since the 1970's:

Why the issue never received more of a hearing from top officials early in the war remains a mystery, given the chorus of concern. One Pentagon analyst complained in an April 29, 2004, e-mail to colleagues, for instance, that it was "frustrating to see the pictures of burning Humvees while knowing that there are other vehicles out there that would provide more protection."

Even more oddly, even as the Pentagon ignored requests for MRAPs for the US military, they pursued purchasing such vehicles for Iraqi troops in December of 2004:

In response, Lt. Col. Clay Brown, based in Australia, sent information on two types of MRAPs manufactured overseas. "By all accounts, these are some of the best in the world," he wrote. "If I were fitting out the Iraqi Army, this is where I'd look (wish we had some!)"

In February 2005 an "urgent-need request" for the same vehicles came from Marines in Anbar, but the request was shelved and fifteen months passed before a second request was made and granted. Democrats have spoken out:

The long delay infuriates some members of Congress. "Every day, our troops are being maimed or killed needlessly because we haven't fielded this soon enough," says Rep. Gene Taylor, D-Miss. "The costs are in human lives, in kids who will never have their legs again, people blind, crippled. That's the real tragedy."

The article notes that some of the known reasons for delay were ideological:

One reason officials put off buying MRAPs in significant quantities: They never expected the war to last this long. Bush set the tone on May 1, 2003, six weeks after the U.S. invasion, when he declared on board the aircraft carrier Abraham Lincoln that "major combat operations in Iraq have ended."

Another reason:

A bigger obstacle might have been philosophical: The MRAP didn't fit the Pentagon's long-term vision of how the military should be equipped.

Then-Defense secretary Donald Rumsfeld regarded the Iraq war "as a means to change" the military, "make it lighter, make it more responsive, make it more agile," Holder says. The MRAP, heavier and slower than the Humvee, wouldn't have measured up, he says.

On Thursday the Armed Services Committee will hold a hearing on the MRAP program.

Rep. Slaughter, from Thursday:

Rep. Slaughter: "The results were sadly predictable. The companies failed to meet demand, and sent critically important equipment over late. Some of the armor our soldiers were sent had cracks that had been painted over instead of fixed. In certain instances, two left doors were sent for the same vehicle. Troops already fighting a deadly foe had to use their precious time and energy to improvise and come up with ways to turn useless equipment into something that could protect them. Our soldiers have been asked to endure terrible hardships - some of which, I am ashamed to say, have been the direct result of the practices of this Administration."